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Multicultural nationalism? National identities among minority groups in Scotland’s 
census 
Abstract 
This paper uses data from a new question in the 2011 UK censuses of population to 
investigate national identities among ethnic and religious minorities. It focuses 
primarily on Scotland, while presenting comparative data for England and Wales. A 
robust comparison of national identities between different minorities in Scotland and 
with similar groups in other nations of Britain has previously not been possible 
because ethnic and religious minority groups represent a small proportion of 
Scotland’s population and are weakly represented in sample surveys. The new census 
question on national identity therefore offers an unprecedented opportunity for this 
kind of analysis. The analysis is used to critically evaluate previous claims of the 
existence of multicultural nationalism in Scotland and previous research that has 
suggested that Scottish identity is relatively inclusive of people in minority groups. 
The findings suggest that while Scottish national identity is relatively inclusive of 
minorities in some respects, the conclusions of previous research should be treated 
with some caution. 
Keywords 
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Introduction 
This paper addresses the relationship between multiculturalism and multinationalism in the 
UK, and more specifically in Scotland. It aims to explore how national plurality (the existence 
of different historic nations within the same state) and ethno-religious plurality (related to 
more recent immigration to that state) may be reconciled. This is examined via a specific 
focus on the national identification of people in ethnic and religious minority groups. To this 
end, the paper employs data from a unique source: the new question on national identity 
introduced in the 2011 UK censuses. This allows, for the first time, both a robust comparison 
of national identities across different minority groups in Scotland, and also a comparison with 
corresponding minorities in other UK sub-state nations. 
The paper assesses the extent to which the apparently inclusive nature of Scottish identity 
with respect to minority groups that has been suggested by previous research is substantiated 
by the census data. Since this relative inclusivity has sometimes been described as 
multinational multicultural citizenship or multicultural nationalism, we begin by examining 
these concepts before discussing relevant empirical research, outlining the data and methods, 
and presenting the analysis and conclusions.  
 
Multicultural Citizenship and Multicultural Nationalism  
A key contemporary concern is the maintenance and fostering of social cohesion within 
national populations that are increasingly diverse in their ethnic origins, and it is commonly 
suggested that in multicultural societies members of the nation should share an overarching 
identity which sits above more particular affinities. This often takes the form of shared 
citizenship (e.g. Kivisto 2002) or national identity. Asari, Halikiopoulou and Mock, for 
example, argue that ‘a strong national identity, albeit of a particular kind, is prerequisite to a 
stable and functioning multicultural society’ (2008, 2). However, as implied by their 
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qualification (‘albeit of a particular kind’), establishing such an identity may be difficult if it 
is to accommodate people from diverse origins.  
This dilemma takes on added complexity in states which encompass multiple nations. This is 
directly addressed by Kymlicka’s (2011) discussion of multicultural citizenship in multination 
states. Given that many of these states have established social and political structures that 
already reflect multinational citizenship, argues Kymlicka, this raises two key questions 
concerning the inclusion of newcomers in these contexts:  
‘How can we ensure that citizenship agendas adopted to deal with immigration do not 
undermine the delicate achievements of multinational citizenship? Conversely, how 
can we ensure that the inherited structures of multinational citizenship do not impede 
the successful inclusion of immigrants?’ (2011, 289). 
Kymlicka outlines four possible ideal-typical approaches to addressing these questions. In the 
first type, existing structures of multinational citizenship (e.g. designed to accommodate 
historic nationalities, languages etc.) serve to exclude immigrants. In the second, a dominant 
national group uses immigration to weaken the claims of historic national minorities, e.g. by 
encouraging immigrants to identify with the dominant group rather than one of these national 
minorities.  
The third and fourth ideal types are more significant, and considered at more length by 
Kymlicka, because unlike the first two approaches he deems these to be normatively 
acceptable. Significantly for our purposes in this paper, Kymlicka also illustrates these 
through reference to the UK, and more specifically Scotland. In the third, ‘postnational’ type, 
immigrants are encouraged to identify with the state level rather than one of the sub-state 
nations, e.g. as British rather than Scottish. While one attraction of this approach is its 
capacity to transcend national cleavages (e.g. immigrants may become British without 
allegiance to any of the constituent nations of the UK), Kymlicka also highlights some 
limitations. One of these is that if immigrants can readily identify with the state level, then 
this does not encourage sub-state nations to be defined in ways that are inclusive of these 
immigrants.  
In the fourth, ‘multinational’ ideal type, immigrants are encouraged to identify with the sub-
state nation, e.g. as Scottish rather than British, and sub-state national identities must 
therefore be (re)conceptualised as multicultural. Kymlicka suggests that in some respects 
Scotland represents a successful example of the multinational model of multicultural 
citizenship, because there is evidence that some key minority groups show substantial levels 
of support for the most obvious political manifestations of Scottish nationalism: an 
independent Scotland and the Scottish National Party. While a ‘postnational’ perspective 
would view immigrant support for the disintegration of the state in which they are resident as 
an integration failure, Kymlicka argues that from the multinational perspective this reflects 
successful integration in that (some) minorities exhibit the same mixture of political-
constitutional positions as people in Scotland more generally: i.e. (British) unionist, 
devolutionist and secessionist. This he contrasts with Quebec, where the absence of any 
significant support for secession among immigrants in the 1995 referendum indicated a 
failure of multinational integration. 
To support his argument (especially concerning Scotland) Kymlicka draws on earlier work by 
Hussain and Miller (2006) on ‘multicultural nationalism’ in Scotland. Although initially it 
might seem that this is a somewhat different concept to Kymlicka’s multicultural citizenship, 
nationalism and citizenship are in some ways closely related and, as noted above, shared 
citizenship and/or national identity are often proposed as important unifying elements in 
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multicultural societies. The essential concerns of Kymlicka and Hussain and Miller are also 
similar in many respects. Both examine how multiculturalism and sub-state nationalism may 
accommodate one another, and in doing so both consider the ‘top-down’ dimension (policies 
and discourses of governments and political elites) and the ‘bottom-up’ dimension 
(perspectives of people in immigrant and minority groups). Both also use Scotland as a key 
example. 
Hussain and Miller develop their argument from evidence derived from a survey, interviews 
and focus groups with ethnic Pakistanis in Scotland. While they initially observe that 
multicultural nationalism in sub-state contexts appears close to being an oxymoron because it 
is inherently more difficult for sub-state nationalism to accommodate ethnic diversity (2006, 
3), ultimately they conclude that ‘multiculturalism and sub-state nationalism have not merely 
coexisted but actually interacted positively within Scotland’ (2006, 199). One of the key 
findings on which this conclusion is based is that there are high levels of Scottish national 
identification among ethnic Pakistanis. Hussain and Miller suggest this might be because 
other territorial identities among this group are weak in comparison to cultural identities, most 
obviously related to being Muslim.  
For Hussain and Miller and Kymlicka respectively, then, evidence for the existence of 
multicultural nationalism or the multinational type of multicultural citizenship in Scotland is 
substantially based on the (national) identification of people in a particular minority group. It 
is this specific dimension – national identities among minorities – that will be developed in 
this paper. First, since both Hussain and Miller and Kymlicka draw on the same body of 
empirical evidence relating to people of Pakistani origin in Scotland, we explore whether their 
findings and conclusions are supported by other research concerning the national identities of 
minorities in Scotland. Second, we reflect on similar evidence from other parts of Britain, 
addressing not only sub-state but also British identity. Third, and most importantly, we 
employ a unique and unprecedented data source, firstly to compare Scotland with other UK 
nations and then to examine it as a specific case in more detail.  
 
National identities and minorities  
A substantial body of qualitative research in Scotland has suggested a considerable 
willingness to identify as Scottish among people in minority groups (Bonino 2015; Hopkins 
2007, 2008; Kyriakides, Virdee, and Modood 2009; Saeed, Blain, and Forbes 1999; Virdee, 
Kyriakides, and Modood 2006). Aside from the survey dimension of Hussain and Miller’s 
(2006) research, quantitative analysis of national identities among minority groups in 
Scotland has been more scarce, but has also reached similar conclusions (Bond 2011; Rosie 
2014; Rosie and Hepburn 2015). All this evidence tends to support Kymlicka’s argument that 
Scotland might represent a successful example of the ‘multinational’ model of minority 
integration. 
That Scottish identity appears to be inclusive of ethnic and religious minorities has been 
attributed to several factors. First, because cultural (and most specifically linguistic) barriers 
to integration and national belonging for migrants and minorities are relatively low compared 
to other prominent sub-state nations. Second, because of a prevailing Scottish political 
consensus that adopts a positive perspective toward immigration and cultural diversity, which 
to some extent contrasts with a more negative and cautious perspective at the (UK) state level. 
Meer (2015) describes this as an ‘aspirational pluralism’ among political elites in Scotland. 
Third, because anti-immigrant parties have not been successful in Scotland, and its major 
nationalist party, the SNP, is explicitly pro-immigration and diversity (Hepburn and Rosie 
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2014; Hopkins 2008; Leith and Soule 2012). These second and third factors were reflected in 
the 2016 EU referendum. Among Scotland’s leading politicians there was consensus in 
support of continuing EU membership and the controversial anti-immigration rhetoric that 
characterised some of the campaign elsewhere in the UK was not evident. A clear majority of 
people in Scotland voted to remain in the EU, and following the UK ‘Brexit’ result Scotland’s 
(SNP) First Minister, Nicola Sturgeon, has been a vocal and active supporter of migrants 
living in Scotland. 
Research concerned with national identities among minorities in Scotland also offers some 
contrasting findings to similar work in England. Here, some studies have indicated a 
reluctance to identify as English (Bond 2011; Curtice and Heath 2000; Thomas and 
Sanderson 2011), and qualitative research sometimes suggests there is an implicit ethnicising 
of English identity that does not apply to British identity (Fenton and Mann 2011, 226-7; 
Leddy-Owen 2014). Similarly, quantitative research focused largely on England has shown 
high levels of British national identification among many minority ethnic and religious groups 
(see e.g. Heath and Demireva 2014; Karlsen and Nazroo 2015; Maxwell 2006; Platt 2014).  
While this might suggest that Kymlicka’s ‘postnational’ rather than ‘multinational’ ideal type 
is predominant in England, it is also important not to overlook the potential effect of the 
transnational quality of Britishness (Mycock 2010, 351). Cohen (1994, 7) has described the 
‘frontiers’ of Britishness as ‘fuzzy’, not least because of its former imperial dimension, which 
endowed British identity with two contrasting elements. On the one hand, it meant that 
Britishness transcended the borders of Britain itself, accommodating the inhabitants of the 
wider empire, many of whom came to live in Britain following decolonisation in the mid-late 
twentieth century. But this imperial legacy is also implicated in more exclusive conceptions 
of Britishness in that the latter was partly defined in contradistinction to the (largely non-
white) inhabitants of the overseas empire (Colley 1992). As Mycock (2010, 351) points out, 
this imperial dimension persists within the context of the contemporary Commonwealth:  
Extensive emigration to and from Commonwealth [sic] continues to contribute to the 
maintenance of strong family and cultural ties tinged with an enduring sense of 
empire. Many Britons may well overlook transnational connotations of the British 
identity and citizenship but it is difficult to deny they persist. 
Although comparatively little research has been conducted concerning the national identities 
of people in minority groups in Wales, we may identify some parallels with both Scotland and 
England. Similarly to Scotland, devolved governments in Wales have generally encouraged 
the promotion of ‘an ethnically inclusive civic national identity’ (Evans, O’Leary and 
Williams 2015, 5) and the leading nationalist party (Plaid Cymru) has also attempted to shift 
towards an ideology that is more inclusive of minority groups (Chaney and Fevre, 2001). But 
Bradbury and Andrews (2010, 234) suggest that, as in England, people in minority ethnic 
groups in Wales tend to find a British identity more accommodating and are relatively 
unlikely to identify as Welsh, and others argue this may be because the centrality of language 
and culture to Welsh identity can exclude those from minority ethnic backgrounds (Scourfield 
and Davies 2005; Williams 1999). 
Nevertheless, some caution is necessary before concluding that, compared to sub-state 
national identities in other parts of Britain, Scottishness is largely inclusive of those in 
minority ethnic and religious groups. Research also suggests ‘the existence of exclusive, non-
civic components within the political and the wider public’s discourse of nationalism in 
Scotland’ (Leith and Soule 2012, 145); that historical narratives and representations of the 
(Scottish) nation may privilege whiteness (Virdee, Kyriakides, and Modood 2006, 3.14); that 
experience of interaction with the White majority sometimes leads to a reluctance among 
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minorities to assert a Scottish identity (Hussain and Miller 2006, 151); and that feelings of 
racial and religious difference or otherness can sometimes prevent those in minority groups 
from fully embracing such an identity (Hopkins 2007, 71). 
Further, despite the considerable value of previous studies concerning the national identities 
of minorities in Scotland, they are limited in that they focus on specific minority groups 
and/or are restricted to low sub-sample sizes. They do not therefore offer evidence that allows 
a reliable comparative analysis of national identities among minority groups across the 
population of Scotland as a whole. Systematic comparison of Scotland and other sub-state UK 
territories has also been largely absent, not least because UK analysis of minorities’ national 
identities has often focused on Britishness, neglected the smaller national territories, and/or 
conflated larger national and state territories such as England/Britain (Hopkins 2008; Virdee, 
Kyriakides, and Modood 2006; Whittaker 2015; Williams 2015). Nandi and Platt (2015) do 
assess and compare state and sub-state national identification among minority groups in the 
UK, but do not address how this might vary between different UK nations, nor indeed the 
distribution of minority ethnic cases across these nations.  
To assess the conclusions of Kymlicka and Hussain and Miller and address the limitations of 
previous research on minorities in Scotland, this paper therefore addresses the following 
questions. To what extent do the national identities of people in different minority groups in 
Scotland (including, but not limited to, ethnic Pakistanis) appear to confirm the predominance 
of multicultural nationalism or the multinational model of multicultural citizenship? Do 
patterns of British identification seem to reflect the postnational model and/or the 
transnational dimension of Britishness? Do British and sub-state national identities vary 
across different ethno-religious groups, and which other factors aside from ethnicity and 
religion might explain these identities?  
 
The Census and national identity: data and analysis 
To address these questions, we employ data from the 2011 decennial censuses of population 
in Scotland and other parts of the UK1. Censuses not only attempt to count and classify 
national populations, but also facilitate the ‘imagining’ of nations (Anderson 1991; Kertzer 
and Arel 2002). While this process contributes to the building of a collective (national) 
identity, censuses also reflect and construct various sub-national identity categories (Kertzer 
and Arel 2002, 2). While censuses in the UK have, since 1851, established the national 
origins of the population via a question on country of birth (Booth 1985), only quite recently 
have questions been introduced which categorise people into different ethnic and religious 
sub-groups. These questions were to some extent a response to post-war mass immigration to 
the UK, which resulted in a growing number of children born to immigrants in the UK, who 
could not therefore be distinguished by country of birth alone.  
However, while questions on ethnicity and religion allowed people to identify themselves in 
more diverse ways that might be distinct from their natal origins, national identity could not 
necessarily be assumed from people’s country of birth, ethnicity and religion. A question on 
national identity was thus introduced in the census of 2011, motivated to some extent by a 
desire to improve people’s capacity to record their ethnonational identification (Office for 
National Statistics 2009; Scottish Government and General Register Office for Scotland 
2008). Data derived from this question are particularly significant for research in Scotland 
because they offer a unique opportunity to rigorously assess the national identities of people 
in various minority ethnic and religious groups. This has previously not been possible using 
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sample surveys which included questions about national identity, principally because of the 
relatively small minority ethnic population in Scotland.  
Our analysis is based on microdata from a random 5 per cent sample of 2011 census returns, 
published via the UK Data Service (Office for National Statistics 2014; National Records of 
Scotland 2015). This is preferred to aggregate data covering all census returns for two 
reasons. First, it facilitates multivariate analysis including bespoke variables. Second, 
aggregate data include recorded national identities for people of all ages, and will therefore 
include many cases where these identities have not been autonomously chosen but more 
likely have been assigned or influenced by a parent or guardian. Although deciding a suitable 
age threshold for the legitimate expression of subjective identities is difficult and available 
guidance varies (see e.g. Parameshwaran and Engzell 2015), to address this limitation only 
people aged sixteen or over were included in the analysis. Despite these restrictions total case 
numbers still far exceed those even of very large social surveys (221,495 in Scotland; 
2,185,090 England; and 127,081 in Wales) but the data offer the same potential for flexible 
analysis as any secondary survey data.  
There are however other limitations that cannot be addressed by employing the microdata. 
The census includes only one simple question on national identity, whereas some surveys 
have also, e.g. sought to assess strength of national identification or belonging (Heath and 
Demireva 2014; Karlsen and Nazroo 2015; Maxwell 2006; Nandi and Platt 2015; Platt 2014), 
and others with a broader range of questions have also, e.g., enabled assessment of whether 
perceived discrimination or extent of interaction with majority group members might 
influence national identification among minorities (Maxwell 2006; de Vroome, Verkuyten, 
and Martinovic 2104). More fundamentally, some have questioned the capacity of any survey 
questions to capture the complexity of the conception and employment of national identities 
(Condor, Gibson, and Abell 2006, 125-6; Hopkins 2007, 66-7; Mann 2011, 111-2). It is 
therefore essential that investigation of national identities via more quantitative measures 
continues to be paralleled by qualitative approaches. 
But despite these limitations the census offers unique advantages in allowing reliable analysis 
of minority groups that represent only a very small proportion of the population. Data and the 
questions on which they are based also benefit from the resources and rigorous testing that the 
census provides. Moreover the general expansion and increasing complexity of UK census 
questions designed to explore subjective identities in recent decades has itself partly been a 
response to criticisms of the census’s limitations in this regard and these questions now take 
up around 40 per cent of the census forms (Williams and Husk 2015, 295). 
The key dependent variables in the analysis were derived from the census question which 
offered people a list of national identities from which to choose. As well as British, the sub-
state identities representing each UK nation (English, Welsh, Scottish, Northern Irish) were 
also explicitly offered, as well as an option to write in another national identity. Although 
participants were encouraged to select more than one option if appropriate, in Scotland, 
England and Wales a clear majority chose a sub-state national identity only. In all analysis 
below, binary dependent variables were used to simply indicate whether someone identified 
as Scottish, British etc. or not.  
The explanatory variables reflect previous research on minorities and national identities. 
Given the aim of assessing the degree to which different national identities may be more or 
less inclusive of people in minority groups, ethnicity and religion were included. Ethnicity is 
also important because it reflects ancestry, which has been described as one of the key 
‘markers’ of national identity (Kiely et al 2001). These markers are essentially the personal 
characteristics people employ when asserting their own national identities and evaluating 
 7 
similar assertions made by others (McCrone and Bechhofer 2015, 29). Religion was also 
included as an indicator of minority status. Because people in some UK ethnic groups 
predominantly belong to one religion (e.g. the vast majority of Pakistanis and Bangladeshis 
are Muslims) whereas others are more spread over different religions (e.g. large numbers of 
Indians are Hindu, Sikh or Muslim), a series of ethno-religious categories were created within 
one explanatory variable, reflecting the religious homogeneity of some groups and the 
diversity of others. This also facilitates comparison with other recent UK research on national 
identification among minority groups, which has taken a similar approach (see e.g. Karlsen 
and Nazroo 2015; Nandi and Platt 2015; Platt 2014).  
Birthplace and residence are also important markers of national identity (Kiely, Bechhofer 
and McCrone 2005), and census data allow the evaluation of the significance of both: all 
individuals state their country of birth and those who were not born in the UK are asked to 
record the year of their most recent arrival in the country. While birthplace is routinely 
considered in research on national identities among minorities, some have also highlighted the 
importance of years spent in the ‘host’ country by migrants (e.g. de Vroome, Verkuyten, and 
Martinovic 2014). Taking into account period of residence reflects the possibility that national 
identification may partly result from socialisation: one may ‘become’ national (Bond 2006). 
The microdata only record a broad period of years within which migrants arrived in the UK 
(not a specific sub-state nation), from which approximate length of UK residence may be 
estimated. Both birth and residence variables could not be included separately because the 
date of arrival variable excludes those born in the UK, so a composite variable was created 
showing the sub-state UK nation in which people were born, or for those not born in the UK 
their approximate period of residence.  
Although unlike some other sub-state nations linguistic proficiency in a language other than 
English is often not considered an important element of Scottish identity, Scotland does have 
its own unique language, Scottish Gaelic, and other research on national identities among 
minorities has sometimes included linguistic proficiency as an explanatory factor (e.g. de 
Vroome, Verkuyten, and Martinovic 2014). The 2011 census recorded self-assessed 
proficiency in both Gaelic and also, for the first time, the Scots language2. Both are included 
as explanatory variables derived from responses to questions regarding perceived ability to 
understand, read, speak and/or write these languages. Social class was also included to assess 
whether national identification might be associated with socio-economic status (see e.g. 
Maxwell 2006; Nandi and Platt 2015; de Vroome, Verkuyten, and Martinovic 2014). 
Analysis is presented in two parts. First, we compare how identification as British and the 
relevant sub-state national identity (Scottish, English, Welsh) varies across ethno-religious 
groups in Scotland, England and Wales. Northern Ireland was not included, mainly because 
the census microdata only distinguish between white people and all others, and do not 
differentiate between those in different non-Christian religions. Second, more detailed logistic 
regression models for Scottish and British identification in Scotland are presented to show the 
variation in national identification across specific ethno-religious groups, controlling for the 
effects of the other key explanatory variables.  
 
Comparing national identities in Scotland, England and Wales 
The ethno-religious groups shown in Table 1 have been constructed to account for the vast 
majority of cases and the largest minority groups, and also to maintain sufficiently large sub-
sample sizes in Scotland and Wales. The White ethnic majority group in each nation includes 
those who identify as White British or as White Scottish, English or Welsh. This is because in 
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the census microdata for England and Wales these categories are amalgamated and in 
Scotland there is only very limited further differentiation between White Scottish and White 
‘Other British’. The analysis also does not focus separately on religious minorities (e.g. 
Christians and Jews) who, through their ethnic identification, largely belong to the White 
majority. Analysis of smaller Christian minorities (cf. Rosie 2014) is also not possible 
because in England and Wales the Christian category is undifferentiated in the microdata and 
in Scotland it is only divided into Church of Scotland, Roman Catholic and Other. Cases 
belonging to unspecified or unusual groups have also been excluded from the analysis (e.g. 
those in the ‘other’ ethnic group, or rare combinations such as Pakistani Sikhs or African 
Buddhists). In Scotland, the African and Caribbean groups are not specifically designated as 
‘Black’, but are here compared with the corresponding Black groups in England and Wales. 
Different Mixed ethnic categories were also distinguished in England and Wales but not in 
Scotland, hence to facilitate comparison total data for all Mixed categories combined are also 
shown for England and Wales.  
Table 1 here 
Table 1 shows that in each of the three sub-state nations the White minority groups have 
lower levels of British identity than the White majority (White British etc.). The Mixed ethnic 
groups, on the other hand, show higher levels of British identity compared to the White 
majority in all three nations, with the exception of the White/Black Caribbean and 
White/Black African groups in Wales. Variation in British identification is most evident 
among the non-white groups, both between and within nations. In England, British 
identification in all these groups is higher than the White majority, but varies widely from less 
than one-third (Chinese or Other Asian: Buddhist) to three-quarters (Bangladeshi Muslim). In 
Wales, only one non-white group shows a lower level of British identification than the White 
majority: Black African Christians. As in England, there is wide variation between groups and 
those in the Bangladeshi and Pakistani Muslim groups and Indian or Other Asian Sikhs show 
particularly high levels of British identification. These specific findings suggest that the 
transnational dimension of Britishness, associated historically with the empire and with the 
contemporary Commonwealth (Mycock 2010) may be important. Focusing on a different 
post-imperial context – the Netherlands – de Vroome, Verkuyten, and Martinovic (2014, 23) 
similarly observe that ‘It could be that colonial migrants show higher attachment to the host 
country due to shared history’. The overall findings also confirm the results of previous recent 
research concerning the British identification of minority groups (Karlsen and Nazroo 2015; 
Nandi and Platt 2015; Platt 2014), and are broadly consistent with Kymlicka’s ‘postnational’ 
type of multicultural citizenship, albeit that the extent to which this is true varies quite widely 
across different minority groups. 
In Scotland, in contrast, although levels of Britishness are substantial among all non-white 
minorities, in several groups lower proportions identify as British than the White majority. 
Further, although Pakistani and Bangladeshi Muslims and Indian and Other Asian Sikhs again 
show the highest levels of British identification, these are substantially lower than in England 
and Wales, and this tends to hold true across most other non-white groups.  
In each nation a much larger proportion of the White majority identify as Scottish, English or 
Welsh than as British3. It should be noted that some contemporary surveys (e.g. British Social 
Attitudes) typically show much more evenly balanced levels of English and British 
identification in England than suggested by the census data, and this contrast might be partly 
related to methodological factors. It has been suggested that the ordering of identity categories 
might influence response (e.g. Office for National Statistics 2009), and English was the first 
category listed in the census form in England (as was Scottish in Scotland, etc.). But the 
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census data are not necessarily very unusual: e.g. analysis of the Annual Population Survey 
(Bond 2011) also shows a much higher degree of English than British identification among 
the White majority in England. In any event, this paper’s key focus is on comparing national 
identities among the White majority with those of various minorities within each sub-state 
nation, rather than comparing the national identities of the White majority across these 
nations. 
In all three nations sub-state national identification in the other ethno-religious groups is 
much lower than the White majority, but there is a marked contrast between Scotland and the 
other nations among non-white minorities, which is even more evident than with British 
identity. With the exception of the Black Caribbean or Other Black groups (especially those 
with no religion), in England and Wales only very small proportions of those in non-white 
minority groups identify with the sub-state nation. While this is also true of a number of these 
groups in Scotland, here large minorities of the Pakistani Muslim, Indian or Other Asian Sikh, 
and Black Caribbean or Other Black (no religion) groups identify as Scottish, and for every 
minority group with only a single exception (Black Caribbean or Other Black Christians in 
England) levels of sub-state identification are clearly higher in Scotland than in the other 
nations.  
Therefore, with regard to the question of whether Scottish identification among minorities 
appears to reflect multicultural nationalism or the multinational model of multicultural 
citizenship, in comparison to England and Wales at least, the answer is yes. Non-white 
minorities in Scotland are much more likely to identify with the sub-state nation than are their 
counterparts in the other nations, where the postnational ideal type appears more appropriate 
and there is more evidence that the transnational dimension of Britishness is a factor. But 
there are at least three substantial qualifications to this conclusion. First, this is not equally 
true for all minorities. The conclusions of Kymlicka and of Hussain and Miller regarding 
Scotland were based on ethnic Pakistanis, the vast majority of whom are Muslims. Some 
previously relevant qualitative research in Scotland has also mainly addressed this group 
(Hopkins 2007; Saeed, Blain, and Forbes 1999) or ‘Asian Muslims’ more widely (Kyriakides, 
Virdee, and Modood 2009; Virdee, Kyriakides, and Modood 2006). But the analysis thus far 
suggests that Pakistani Muslims, while indeed showing quite high levels of Scottish 
identification, might not be representative of minority groups more generally in Scotland. 
While nearly half of adult Pakistani Muslims identify as Scottish, in many other groups less 
than one-fifth do so. Second, British identification is still substantial among Mixed and non-
white minority groups in Scotland, and for nearly all groups this is actually more prominent 
than Scottish identity. This suggests that Kymlicka’s postnational model also applies to 
Scotland to a considerable extent, and that the transnational dimension of Britishness is also 
relevant to Scotland, albeit not as prominently as in England and Wales. Finally, Scottish 
identification among all minority groups is much lower than it is among the White majority, 
which once more does not unequivocally suggest a national context in which multicultural 
nationalism or the multinational model of multicultural citizenship predominate.  
 
Explaining national identities among minority groups in Scotland 
The variation in national identification shown in Table 1 might result, at least partly, from 
differences between the groups relating to other key markers of national identity, most 
notably country of birth but also, for those not born in the UK or in Scotland, their period of 
residence in the country. Tables 2 and 3 thus present logistic regression models showing how 
identification as Scottish or British varies across the different ethno-religious groups in 
Scotland4, controlling for the effects of the other key explanatory variables outlined earlier. 
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These are binary logistic regressions because in each model the dependent variable simply 
reflects whether a Scottish or British national identity was chosen or not. While Table 2 
shows how various minority groups differ from the White majority, in order to give a clearer 
presentation of how these minority groups compare with each other, Table 3 excludes the 
White majority from the analysis. In other respects the structure of these tables is similar, save 
that the order of the ethno-religious groups is changed in Table 3 to offer the clearest 
comparison with the Pakistani Muslim group, which is used as the reference category rather 
than White British etc. This is done because Pakistani Muslims are the largest non-white 
minority group in Scotland and, as we have seen, they provide the key evidential basis for the 
conclusions of Kymlicka and Miller and Hussain. For ease of reference, each of the four 
models across the two tables is labelled with its own number (Model 1, Model 2 etc.). 
In each model all variables are categorical, and the reference category for each is shown in 
brackets. Where the regression coefficient (B) is positive this indicates people in that category 
are more likely to identify as Scottish (or British) compared to people in the reference 
category, and if the B coefficient is negative the reverse is true. For each coefficient there is 
an indication of whether and at what level the difference from the reference category is 
statistically significant and the standard error (S.E) is shown to indicate the breadth of the 
confidence interval. Odds ratios are also presented: the further these deviate from 1, the 
greater the difference in levels of identification between that category and the reference 
category, controlling for the other variables. Odds ratios greater than 1 indicate that people in 
that category of the variable are more likely to identify as Scottish (or British) compared to 
people in the reference category, and odds ratios less than 1 show the reverse.  
Each model also shows the overall pseudo R2 value (Nagelkerke R2). Potentially ranging from 
0 to 1, this gives an indication of how much the explanatory variables help us account for 
variation in Scottish and British identification, with values closer to 0 indicating a weaker 
explanatory ‘fit’. For each model the variables were also entered separately in four blocks, 
beginning with ethno-religious group. Monitoring the increase in R2 with the addition of the 
further explanatory variables (birth-residence, occupational class, and finally the two 
language variables) therefore reflects the extent to which these variables add to our 
understanding of variation in national identities compared to ethno-religious group alone. 
Tables 2 and 3 here 
A number of the key findings in Scotland from Table 1 hold true after controlling for the 
effects of the other explanatory variables. Table 2 shows that those in the White minority 
groups are less likely than the White majority to identify as Scottish (Model 1) or British 
(Model 2) whereas those belonging to Mixed ethnic groups are less likely than the White 
majority to identify as Scottish but more likely to identify as British. This is also true for most 
of the non-white groups, and Table 3 shows that there is substantial variation in levels of 
Scottish (Model 3) and British (Model 4) identification across these groups. As researchers 
focusing mainly on national identities among minorities in England have often found (Karlsen 
and Nazroo 2015; Maxwell 2006), being Muslim is certainly no barrier to identifying as 
British, but the evidence from Scotland suggests, firstly, that this is also true of Scottish 
identity to some extent at least, but secondly, that the specific Muslim ethnic group to which 
one belongs is also likely to influence national identity. Model 3 shows that whereas 
Bangladeshi and Indian or Other Asian Muslims are significantly less likely to identify as 
Scottish than are Pakistani Muslims, this is not true of African or Arab Muslims.  
Focusing on the three Indian or Other Asian groups also illustrates the value of taking religion 
into account alongside ethnic group. While Indian or Other Asian Muslims and Hindus are 
significantly less likely to identify as Scottish  (Model 3) or British (Model 4) than are 
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Pakistani Muslims, Sikhs are also significantly less likely to identify as British but do not 
differ significantly from Pakistani Muslims in their Scottish identification. These differences 
in British identification between groups whose origins are largely in former British colonies 
also suggests that the post-imperial dimension of Britishness is less clearly evident in 
Scotland. 
Both birthplace and (for migrants to the UK) duration of residence have some influence on 
both Scottish and British identification, but in quite different ways. Compared to those born in 
Scotland, all those born elsewhere are much less likely to identify as Scottish. This is true 
whether the White majority are included (Model 1) or we focus only on minority groups 
(Model 3). Both models also indicate that, for those born outside the UK, duration of 
residence does have some effect: longer-term residents are considerably more likely to 
identify as Scottish than are more recent arrivals, but still much less likely than the Scottish-
born. Overall then, birthplace is key to Scottish identity, which has been well-established in 
previous research (Bond 2006; Kiely et al 2001, 2005) and ‘becoming’ Scottish is relatively 
unusual, even for migrants who are likely to be very long-term residents in Scotland. In 
relation to British identification in Scotland (Models 2 and 4), birthplace is most obviously 
significant in the sense that those living in Scotland who were born in one of the other UK 
nations are considerably more likely to see themselves as British than are those born in 
Scotland, but it is not significant in the sense that, unlike Scottish identity, not being born in 
the UK is clearly no obstacle to becoming British. Rather, residence appears the key marker 
of Britishness for migrants, because those who have lived in the UK for a relatively long 
period of time are considerably more likely to identify as British than are those born in 
Scotland, whereas relatively recent migrants (resident less than 8-10 years) are less likely to 
do so.  
The different ways in which the key markers of national identity are implicated in 
identification as Scottish or British are also reflected in the R2 values for the four models in 
Tables 2 and 3. Although some caution is necessary in comparing pseudo R2 across different 
models in logistic regression, the different contribution which each explanatory variable 
makes to the total R2 within each model suggests some interesting contrasts. Ethno-religious 
group contributes more markedly to variation in Scottish identification when the White 
majority are included (Model 1) than for minorities only (Model 3). In Model 1, adding this 
variable alone gives an R2 = 0.218 compared to only 0.091 in Model 3, reflecting the fact that 
differences in Scottish identification are much more marked between the White majority and 
the various minority groups than they are between these minority groups. But although 
ethnicity (and hence ancestry) is therefore an important marker of Scottish identity to some 
extent, in both models it is the birth-residence variable that makes the most marked 
contribution to variation in Scottish identification, increasing R2 from 0.218 to 0.563 in Model 
1 and from 0.091 to 0.361 in Model 3. Since the detailed regression coefficients in each 
model indicate that this effect is largely attributable to birthplace rather than period of 
residence, this confirms the centrality of birthplace as a marker of Scottish identity for people 
in general and also more specifically for minorities. 
When we examine Britishness (Models 2 and 4) the effect of the initial addition of the ethno-
religious group variable alone is different to that found for Scottish identification. When the 
White majority are included (Model 2) this variable only yields an initial R2 value of 0.018 
compared to 0.182 when the White majority are excluded (Model 4). The coefficients suggest 
this is because (with the marginal and non-significant exception of Bangladeshi Muslims) 
compared to Pakistani Muslims levels of British identification are consistently lower among 
people in the other minority groups. This again suggests that national identities among 
Pakistani Muslims might not be representative of other minority groups in Scotland that have 
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been less researched. More similarly to the models of Scottish identity, the birth-residence 
variable again contributes substantially to variation in British identification, increasing R2 
from 0.018 to 0.079 in Model 2 and from 0.182 to 0.356 in Model 4. But, in contrast to 
Scottish identification (Models 1 and 3) the regression coefficients indicate that both 
birthplace and residence are important dimensions in this increase.  
Finally, compared to the key markers of national identity discussed above, occupational class 
and language proficiency do not contribute much to our overall capacity to explain variation 
in Scottish or British identification: adding these variables only increases R2 modestly in each 
of the four models. Nevertheless, these variables do show some significant and clear effects. 
Especially when the White majority are included (Models 1 and 2), compared to those in 
higher managerial and professional groups people in other class categories are more likely to 
see themselves as Scottish but less likely to identify as British, and these differences are 
particularly evident in the more working-class categories (semi-routine and routine 
occupations). Although a similar general pattern is evident among minorities only (Models 3 
and 4), here inter-group differences are rather less marked and indeed some are not 
statistically significant.  
Perceived Gaelic language proficiency is positively associated with Scottish national 
identification (Model 1) and negatively associated with British identification (Model 2), but 
these effects appear to be restricted to the White majority, as they are less marked and indeed 
not significant among minorities only (Models 3 and 4)5. Degree of Gaelic proficiency also 
does not have any further effect even when the White majority are included. Proficiency in 
Scots (and perceived degree of this proficiency) is positively associated with Scottish 
identification whether the White majority are included (Model 1) or not (Model 3), but has no 
clear effect on British identification (Models 2 and 4).  
 
Discussion and Conclusions 
The analysis substantiates the conclusions of Kymlicka and Hussain and Miller and the 
findings of previous, largely qualitative research to some extent at least. Compared to sub-
state identities in other parts of Britain, Scottish national identity is relatively inclusive of 
those in (particularly non-white) minority ethno-religious groups. Multicultural nationalism 
and the multinational model of multicultural citizenship are more apparent in Scotland than in 
England and Wales, where Kymlicka’s postnational model is more evident. However, the 
findings also suggest that these conclusions need to be tempered in at least three key respects. 
First, if we examine national identities across various ethno-religious minorities in Scotland 
then even when we control for the effects of birthplace and other potentially influential 
variables people in minority groups are still considerably less likely to identify as Scottish 
than the White majority. Birthplace is certainly key, in that ‘becoming’ Scottish on the basis 
of long-term residence and/or socialisation is somewhat rare, but ancestry as a marker of 
national identity (here reflected by ethno-religious background) is also significant.  
Second, variation in national identification between minority groups suggests that focusing on 
Pakistani Muslims might give a somewhat exaggerated sense of the degree to which 
multicultural nationalism prevails in Scotland. People in most other minority groups are 
significantly less likely to identify as Scottish than are Pakistani Muslims, even after 
accounting for the effects of other important variables. Why might this be? Hussain and 
Miller’s (2006) argument that because of the centrality of cultural-religious identities for 
Pakistanis they adopt (new) territorial identities relatively easily would appear to have some 
weight. But this does not fully explain variation in Scottish identities between minority 
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groups because people in some other Muslim groups are less likely to identify as Scottish than 
some non-Muslim groups. Hussain and Miller’s argument also does not explain why Pakistani 
Muslims in other parts of Britain clearly do not adopt sub-state identities as readily as in 
Scotland.  
This may be because Scottish identity is indeed perceived as relatively inclusive by minority 
groups and that multicultural nationalism and multinational multicultural citizenship do 
prevail to some extent. But the third and final reason for caution in drawing this conclusion 
relates to evidence of Kymlicka’s alternative postnational model of multicultural citizenship 
in Scotland. People in most minority groups are more likely to identify as British than are the 
White majority, even though this applies most obviously to Pakistani Muslims, once more 
suggesting they may be a somewhat unusual minority group in Scotland. Might this be 
attributable to the enduring transnational quality of Britishness highlighted by those such as 
Mycock (2010)? The evidence for this seems less compelling than in Wales and (especially) 
England, where those minorities whose roots most obviously lie in the former empire are 
indeed the most likely to identify as British. But it would help explain why certain groups in 
Scotland (most obviously Pakistani and Bangladeshi Muslims) are particularly likely to see 
themselves as British. However, some other evidence suggests that Britishness may be 
viewed as a more inclusive identity by some people in minority groups, even in Scotland, 
because it is perceived as less related to natal origins. Whereas being born in Scotland seems 
a fundamentally important marker of Scottish identity, in contrast it seems that many migrants 
in Scotland become British over time. 
Compared to these key markers of national identity, the effects on Scottish and British 
identification of the other variables considered are more modest. However, the findings 
perhaps suggest that the extent to which Kymlicka’s postnational or multinational ideal types 
are appropriate in understanding the identification of minorities may be mediated to some 
extent by social class. Among minorities, as in the Scottish population more widely, sub-state 
national identities are more commonly expressed among working-class groups whereas those 
in middle-class occupations are comparatively likely to identify as British.  
In closing, the limitations of the data and analysis should also be reiterated, particularly with 
regard to explaining variation in national identification across minority groups that appears 
unrelated to the key markers of identity. For example, it may be that Pakistani Muslims are 
relatively unusual because of the length of time they have been an established minority in 
Scotland (see e.g. Bond forthcoming). This might have served to normalise Scottish 
identification among this group, but this would need to be explored through further, more 
focused qualitative research, perhaps of a comparative nature.  
Despite these limitations, the findings are based on an unprecedented data source that allows 
for the first time a robust overview of the national identification of people across diverse 
minority groups in Scotland, rather than focusing on one particular group or relying on very 
small and less reliable samples. This has shown that previous conclusions regarding the 
identification and integration of minorities in Scotland should be treated with some caution. 
Nevertheless, the (also unprecedented) comparison with other UK nations has also shown that 
to some extent at least Scotland is different and Scottish identity more inclusive compared to 
similar sub-state identities. This highlights the importance of taking both state and sub-state 
national identities into account, and recognising the potential significance of the specific sub-
state context, when investigating the national identification of minorities in multination states 
more generally.  
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Notes 
1. Formally, three separate censuses are conducted – in England and Wales, Scotland and 
Northern Ireland – but these take place on the same day and include very similar questions. 
2. A complex objective because the vocabulary and grammar of Scots is much closer to 
English than is Gaelic, and because of the variety of (regional) forms encompassed by the 
term ‘Scots’ (see e.g. Douglas 2009). 
3. In Wales the lower proportion compared to Scotland and England is influenced by the 
number of migrants from England: nearly a quarter of adults in Wales were born in England. 
Only 11% of migrants from England who are part of the White majority group in Wales 
identify as Welsh, compared to 88% of those in the White majority who were born in Wales. 
4. The White Polish group was distinguished from the White Other group in Scotland, but not 
in England and Wales, and is therefore shown separately in Tables 2 and 3 but not in Table 1. 
5. Although relatively few in number, there are still more than 300 adults in minority groups 
in the 5% sample data who have some Gaelic proficiency, and proportionately they do not 
differ much from the White majority in this regard.  
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Table 1: British and sub-state national identification by ethno-religious group for adults aged 16+ in Scotland, England, Wales (2011 Census) 
 % identify as British  % identify as Scottish/English/Welsh 
 Scotland N England N Wales N Scotland N England N Wales N 
Ethno-religious group             
White British etc. 31 201,467 26 1,743,729 26 108,403 87 201,467 82 1,743,611 67 108,403 
White Irish 16 2,530 20 24,466 21 701 28 2,530 14 24,465 8 701 
White Other 9 7,006 14 106,696 10 2,493 15 7,006 7 106,696 6 2,493 
Pakistani Muslim 54 1,518 68 34,095 63 347 43 1,518 15 34,087 19 347 
Bangladeshi Muslim 48 121 75 13,052 75 310 20 121 7 13,049 13 310 
Indian/Other Asian: Muslim 24 238 60 14,069 40 169 16 238 11 14,064 7 169 
(Black) African Muslim 28 170 45 6,314 40 107 16 170 7 6,311 6 107 
Arab Muslim 33 237 45 6,042 29 279 24 237 8 6,042 5 279 
Indian/Other Asian: Hindu 24 645 59 31,880 40 451 15 645 10 31,870 6 451 
Indian/Other Asian: Sikh 48 314 67 14,541 64 103 41 314 16 14,538 12 103 
Chinese/Other Asian: Buddhist 30 297 30 6,274 32 181 15 297 6 6,273 2 181 
Chinese: No religion 30 1,011 36 10,065 29 409 18 1,011 8 10,065 7 409 
(Black) African Christian 23 740 44 24,913 22 313 14 740 10 24,907 3 313 
(Black) Caribbean/ 
(Other) Black: Christian 
46 128 62 23,085 52 153 26 128 28 23,078 18 153 
(Black) Caribbean/ 
(Other) Black: No religion 
37 83 53 4,373 55 49 46 83 41 4,371 37 49 
Any Asian or Arab Christian 36 707 42 18,898 39 603 27 707 11 18,894 7 603 
Mixed White/Black Caribbean - - 35 11,463 23 372 - - 67 11,463 66 372 
Mixed White/Black African - - 38 4,150 26 132 - - 36 4,150 51 132 
Mixed White/Asian - - 47 8,742 46 308 - - 45 8,740 41 308 
Other Mixed - - 40 8,337 42 209 - - 35 8,333 41 209 
Mixed (All) 41 558 40 32,692 34 1,021 52 558 49 32,686 51 1,021 
 
Note: All percentages are rounded to the nearest whole per cent 
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Table 2: logistic regression of Scottish and British identification for adults aged 16+, Scotland (2011 
Census)  
 
MODEL 1 
Scottish  
(Nagelkerke R2 = 0.579) 
MODEL 2 
British  
(Nagelkerke R2 = 0.108) 
  B S.E. 
Odds 
ratio 
B S.E. 
Odds 
ratio 
Ethno-religious group (White Scottish etc.)       
White Irish - 1.670** 0.061 0.188 - 1.299** 0.060 0.273 
White Polish - 1.424** 0.083 0.241 - 0.955** 0.104 0.385 
White Other - 1.588** 0.058 0.204 - 1.029** 0.058 0.357 
Mixed - 0.412* 0.120 0.662 + 0.262** 0.095 1.300 
Pakistani Muslim - 1.057** 0.070 0.347 +1.041** 0.059 2.833 
Bangladeshi Muslim - 1.804** 0.268 0.165 + 0.919** 0.204 2.508 
Indian or Other Asian: Muslim - 1.480** 0.202 0.228 + 0.097 0.172 1.102 
African Muslim - 1.177** 0.221 0.308 + 0.628** 0.195 1.874 
Arab Muslim - 0.888** 0.177 0.412 + 0.695** 0.163 2.003 
Indian or Other Asian: Hindu - 1.357** 0.132 0.258 + 0.205* 0.111 1.228 
Indian or Other Asian: Sikh - 1.161** 0.146 0.313 + 0.594** 0.123 1.811 
Chinese or Other Asian: Buddhist - 1.660** 0.184 0.190 + 0.320* 0.146 1.377 
Chinese: No religion - 1.723** 0.105 0.179 + 0.474** 0.084 1.607 
African: Christian - 1.442** 0.121 0.236 + 0.112 0.104 1.119 
Any Asian or Arab: Christian - 1.215** 0.108 0.297 + 0.477** 0.092 1.612 
Caribbean or Black: Christian - 1.461** 0.256 0.232 + 0.573** 0.196 1.773 
Caribbean or Black: No religion - 0.751* 0.300 0.472 - 0.019 0.243 0.981 
Birthplace/Residence (Born Scotland)       
Born England - 3.858** 0.020 0.021 + 1.172** 0.015 3.230 
Born Northern Ireland - 4.174** 0.075 0.015 + 0.797** 0.055 2.218 
Born Wales - 4.006** 0.089 0.018 + 0.701** 0.072 2.015 
Not born UK, resident 70+ years - 2.160** 0.150 0.115 + 1.136** 0.145 3.115 
Not born UK, resident 61-70 years - 1.966** 0.114 0.140 + 1.010** 0.110 2.745 
Not born UK, resident 51-60 years - 2.287** 0.087 0.102 + 0.898** 0.084 2.456 
Not born UK, resident 41-50 years - 2.152** 0.070 0.116 + 0.780** 0.067 2.182 
Not born UK, resident 31-40 years - 2.101** 0.069 0.122 + 0.783** 0.065 2.187 
Not born UK, resident 21-30 years - 2.347** 0.073 0.096 + 0.686** 0.069 1.986 
Not born UK, resident 11-20 years - 2.535** 0.061 0.079 + 0.589** 0.056 1.803 
Not born UK, resident 8-10 years - 2.865** 0.087 0.057 + 0.221** 0.077 1.247 
Not born UK, resident 5-7 years - 3.203** 0.073 0.041 - 0.731** 0.075 0.482 
Not born UK, resident 2-4 years - 3.617** 0.075 0.027 - 1.315** 0.082 0.269 
Not born UK, resident < 2 years - 4.372** 0.108 0.013 - 2.396** 0.128 0.091 
Social Class (Higher managerial/prof.)       
Lower managerial/professional + 0.190** 0.030 1.210 - 0.300** 0.019 0.741 
Intermediate + 0.299** 0.033 1.348 - 0.488** 0.020 0.614 
Small employer or own account worker + 0.201** 0.038 1.222 - 0.591** 0.023 0.554 
Lower supervisory and technical + 0.353** 0.038 1.424 - 0.768** 0.023 0.464 
Semi-routine + 0.499** 0.033 1.648 - 0.861** 0.020 0.423 
Routine + 0.572** 0.035 1.771 - 1.021** 0.021 0.360 
Gaelic language proficiency (None)       
Can understand only + 0.598** 0.128 1.819 - 0.446** 0.077 0.640 
Can speak, read and/or write + 0.538** 0.085 1.713 - 0.443** 0.048 0.642 
Scots language proficiency (None)       
Can understand only + 0.391** 0.034 1.478 + 0.134** 0.021 1.143 
Can speak, read and/or write + 1.018** 0.020 2.767 - 0.153** 0.011 0.858 
 
*significant at p < 0.05; ** significant at p < 0.01 
  
 20 
Table 3: logistic regression of Scottish and British identification for adults aged 16+ excluding White 
majority, Scotland (2011 Census) 
 
MODEL 3 
Scottish  
(Nagelkerke R2 = 0.380) 
MODEL 4 
British  
(Nagelkerke R2 = 0.358) 
  B S.E. 
Odds 
ratio 
B S.E. 
Odds 
ratio 
Ethno-religious group (Pakistani Muslim)       
Bangladeshi Muslim - 0.696* 0.269 0.498 + 0.011 0.212 1.011 
Indian or Other Asian: Muslim - 0.411* 0.208 0.663 - 0.688** 0.182 0.502 
African Muslim - 0.078 0.228 0.925 - 0.188 0.203 0.829 
Arab Muslim + 0.214 0.184 1.238 - 0.121 0.172 0.886 
Indian or Other Asian: Hindu - 0.345* 0.143 0.708 - 0.455** 0.125 0.635 
Indian or Other Asian: Sikh - 0.165 0.151 0.848 - 0.457** 0.135 0.633 
Chinese or Other Asian: Buddhist - 0.560** 0.191 0.571 - 0.460** 0.156 0.631 
Chinese: No religion - 0.582** 0.119 0.559 - 0.392** 0.100 0.676 
African: Christian - 0.371** 0.134 0.690 - 0.620** 0.117 0.538 
Any Asian or Arab: Christian - 0.165 0.121 0.848 - 0.339** 0.107 0.713 
Caribbean or Black: Christian - 0.503* 0.250 0.604 - 0.310 0.206 0.734 
Caribbean or Black: No religion - 0.006 0.282 0.994 - 1.132** 0.254 0.322 
White Irish - 0.645** 0.092 0.525 - 2.222** 0.094 0.108 
White Polish - 0.341** 0.104 0.711 - 1.681** 0.118 0.186 
White Other - 0.562** 0.083 0.570 - 1.763** 0.080 0.171 
Mixed + 0.356** 0.129 1.427 - 0.723** 0.114 0.485 
Birthplace/Residence (Born Scotland)       
Born England - 2.639** 0.107 0.071 + 1.338** 0.096 3.812 
Born Northern Ireland - 3.797** 0.181 0.022 + 0.687** 0.122 1.987 
Born Wales - 2.860** 0.575 0.057 + 0.578 0.458 1.783 
Not born UK, resident 70+ years - 1.745** 0.428 0.175 + 1.499** 0.421 4.476 
Not born UK, resident 61-70 years - 1.527** 0.186 0.217 + 1.028** 0.197 2.796 
Not born UK, resident 51-60 years - 1.999** 0.144 0.135 + 0.905** 0.146 2.472 
Not born UK, resident 41-50 years - 2.045** 0.118 0.129 + 0.536** 0.118 1.709 
Not born UK, resident 31-40 years - 2.108** 0.109 0.122 + 0.683** 0.105 1.980 
Not born UK, resident 21-30 years - 2.242** 0.111 0.106 + 0.417** 0.105 1.518 
Not born UK, resident 11-20 years - 2.402** 0.090 0.091 + 0.216* 0.084 1.241 
Not born UK, resident 8-10 years - 2.684** 0.106 0.068 - 0.156 0.095 0.855 
Not born UK, resident 5-7 years - 3.016** 0.090 0.049 - 1.130** 0.091 0.323 
Not born UK, resident 2-4 years - 3.383** 0.093 0.034 - 1.824** 0.101 0.161 
Not born UK, resident < 2 years - 4.190** 0.129 0.015 - 3.035** 0.157 0.048 
Social Class (Higher managerial/prof.)       
Lower managerial/professional + 0.175* 0.089 1.192 - 0.097 0.082 0.908 
Intermediate + 0.236* 0.105 1.266 - 0.139 0.100 0.870 
Small employer or own account worker + 0.202 0.103 1.224 - 0.105 0.098 0.901 
Lower supervisory and technical + 0.170 0.109 1.185 - 0.181 0.105 0.835 
Semi-routine + 0.204* 0.095 1.227 - 0.230* 0.090 0.794 
Routine + 0.229* 0.102 1.258 - 0.499** 0.106 0.607 
Gaelic language proficiency (None)       
Can understand only + 0.412 0.231 1.509 - 0.328 0.308 0.720 
Can speak, read and/or write + 0.045 0.225 1.046 - 0.391 0.272 0.676 
Scots language proficiency (None)       
Can understand only + 0.585** 0.088 1.794 - 0.037 0.099 0.963 
Can speak, read and/or write + 0.929** 0.062 2.532 - 0.056 0.067 0.945 
 
*significant at p < 0.05; ** significant at p < 0.01 
  
 
